What a site reads
A fingerprint is not one value but a pile of small ones: screen size, time zone, installed fonts, the exact way your GPU draws a curve. Each is shared with millions; the combination often is not.
The test reads these values inside your browser. Nothing leaves it: the fingerprint is neither stored nor sent to our server.
Changing your IP does not change this: a proxy changes your address, not the way your GPU draws a curve.
The number is the share of the signals we ask for that your browser actually handed over, weighted by how much each one distinguishes people — not a sum of weights. That distinction matters: a score built from the sum would describe our weighting table rather than you, and a hardened browser would end up with the same figure as a wide-open one. Values that come back as blocked or unknown do not count toward the total, so refusing to answer lowers the score, which is the honest direction.
A low score means your browser is stingy with signals. It does not mean you are unidentifiable: on a rare combination of platform and settings, being unusual is itself identifying. The famous paradox of fingerprinting is that the most heavily locked-down browser can be the most recognisable one on a site where nobody else looks like it.
Canvas and WebGL: the browser is asked to draw something and the result is hashed. The same instructions produce slightly different pixels on different GPUs, drivers and font stacks.
GPU and hardware: the renderer string, processor count and memory bracket.
Fonts: which of a probe list are present — an installed-software history that is remarkably personal.
Screen and window: resolution, colour depth, device pixel ratio.
Time zone and languages: the two that most often contradict a proxy's country.
Audio: the output of an audio-processing graph, which varies by platform in the same way canvas does.
Every signal above is read from your machine by JavaScript. None of them travels through your IP address, so switching proxy, rotating an address pool or connecting through another country leaves the fingerprint identical. This is why a site can recognise the same browser across a dozen different IPs without a single cookie, and why proxy rotation alone does not produce distinct identities. A real anti-detect setup changes the fingerprint and the IP and the time zone together; changing one of the three makes the other two into a signature.
Everything runs in your browser. The values are computed locally, shown to you and not stored. What the server side of the same question looks like is on the HTTP headers page, and the address side is on what is my IP.
The combination of properties a site can read from your browser — graphics output, fonts, screen, time zone, hardware — which together are distinctive enough to recognise the same browser again without storing anything on your device.
Barely. Private windows clear cookies and history, but the same GPU, fonts, screen and time zone are reported, so the fingerprint is essentially the one you had a moment ago.
It means fewer signals were given up, which is generally better. It is not a guarantee of anonymity: a rare combination of a few signals can identify you more reliably than a common combination of many.
Because it is read from your machine by JavaScript rather than from your connection. Your IP is not an input to it, so rotating addresses changes nothing about it — and a stable fingerprint across many addresses is itself a pattern sites look for.
Partly. Anti-detect browsers substitute canvas, WebGL and font results; Tor Browser goes the other way and makes everyone look the same. Ad-hoc spoofing usually adds contradictions — a Windows User-Agent with a macOS font list — that are easier to spot than the original.
No. The whole test runs in your browser, the values are displayed to you and nothing is sent to our server or saved.